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In this paper we examine whether and how the inflow of female immigrants who 
“specialize” in household production affects the labor supply of Italian women. To identify 
the causal effect, we exploit the family reunification motive and the network effects - i.e. the 
tendency of newly arriving female immigrants to settle in places where males of the same 
country already live - as an instrument for the geographical distribution of female foreign 
workers. We find that the higher the number of immigrants who provide household services 
the more time native Italian women spend at work (intensive margin) without affecting their 
labor force participation (extensive margin). The impact is concentrated on the highly skilled 
women whose time has a higher opportunity cost. These results also hold after a battery of 
robustness checks. Some further evidence confirms that the impact passes through the 
substitution in household work rather than complementarities in the production sector. 
Finally, we show that immigration arises as a substitute to publicly provided welfare 
services, although this raises concerns about the fairness and the sustainability of this private 
and informal welfare model. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION
 
In developed countries, female immigrants largely provide household 
services, such as housekeeping and caring for children and the elderly. At the 
same time, household responsibilities constrain the female labor supply, 
especially in those countries where women are more engaged in these activities 
because of cultural models and/or the inadequacy of welfare policies. Despite this, 
the connection between immigration and the female labor supply has received 
little attention. In the literature on the female labor supply, the focus is on the lack 
of and costs of care services with almost no attention being given to the role of 
female immigrants who largely provide those services. On the other hand, studies 
analyzing the impact of immigration on the host country focus on the degree of 
substitutability in the production sector. The potential substitutability in household 
production, where most of the female immigrants are employed, is surprisingly 
under investigated. Moreover, the impact of immigration on the native labor 
supply is examined for the extensive margin (employment or labor force 
participation), never for the intensive margin (hours worked). 
In this paper, we examine the link between immigration and the female 
labor supply in the Italian context. Italy is an interesting case as it has registered a 
recent and exceptional increase in low-skilled immigration. At the end of 2008, 
there were about 3.9 million resident foreigners (6.5 percent of the population), 
and it has become a prime destination of migration flows in the EU. At the same 
time, the proportion of low-skilled immigrants (and of those employed in 
domestic services) is much larger than in other European countries and in the U.S. 
The female component has gained increasing relevance and now exceeds that of 
men. Italy is peculiar also in terms of the female labor supply as it performs 
poorly in an international comparison concerning the extent of labor force 
participation and time use.
1 In 2008, the female activity rate was the second lowest 
in EU 27. In addition, among the employed women, how they use their time is 
markedly different because they spend more time performing household activities 
than their European counterparts (from a minimum of one and one-half hours to a 
maximum of nearly five hours per week). Alesina and Ichino (2009) document the 
large size of unpaid family work and its implications for female labor supply 
decisions. 
To examine whether and how the inflow of female immigrants has affected 
the Italian women’s labor supply, we combine microdata drawn from the 2006–
2008 waves of the Labor Force Survey (LFS) with aggregate data on the presence 
of immigrants at the local labor market (LLM) level. LLMs are clusters of 
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at the AIEL conference (Sassari, 2009) and at the Bank of Italy seminars for comments and 
suggestions. The views expressed herein are our own and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
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1 Traditional explanations include cultural reasons and the inadequacy of child and elder care 
services (Chiuri, 2000; Bettio and Plantenga, 2004; Del Boca and Vuri, 2007). Tensions on the 
female labor supply are particularly strong for the current generation that is sandwiched between 
care for their aging parents and for their children (Marenzi and Pagani, 2008).   6
municipalities, which are grouped based on commuting patterns that can be 
interpreted as self-contained labor markets. In our opinion, they represent a more 
appropriate territorial configuration with respect to larger administrative areas 
(e.g., regions or provinces) to examine the interaction between natives and 
immigrants. The most important reason is that domestic services cannot be traded 
outside of a local market. In order to identify the household production 
substitution effect, we do not consider overall immigration but only female 
immigrants specialized in housekeeping, child care, and elder care (specialized 
immigrants, hereafter). 
Estimating the impact of specialized immigration by standard OLS might 
lead to biased results for several reasons. Local omitted variables (e.g., local 
amenities) might affect both the immigrants’ location choices and the native labor 
supply. Moreover, reverse causality might be at work if a higher intensity of work 
of native females leads to a higher demand of specialized immigrants. Finally, 
there might be some concerns about the measure of our key explanatory variable 
due to undocumented immigrants. To deal with these issues, we adopt an 
instrumental variable strategy that, in our opinion, represents a slight 
improvement with respect to the prevailing approach. We exploit the tendency of 
newly arriving female immigrants to settle in places where males of the same 
country already live to build an instrument for the current geographical 
distribution of female foreign workers. The use of previous settlements is widely 
accepted in the migration literature, and the exogeneity of the instrument relies on 
the fact that the historical distribution across geographical areas is unrelated to the 
current economic conditions of the same areas (Card, 2001). However, local 
shocks that are sufficiently persistent across time might threaten its validity. To 
strengthen the exogeneity of the instrument, we exploit the fact that pull (labor 
market) factors differ substantially between male and female foreign workers. 
We find that a higher incidence of immigrants who provide household 
services has a positive and significant impact on hours worked by native women. 
On the other hand, the effect on the extensive margin (labor force participation) is 
not significantly different from zero. Our finding on the intensity of work is fully 
driven by highly skilled women, whereas a similar effect is not found for low-
skilled women whose time has a lower opportunity cost. These results hold also 
after a battery of robustness checks. Some further pieces of evidence confirm that 
the impact passes through the substitution in household work rather than 
complementarities in the production sector. Indeed, specialized immigration is 
correlated with domestic service supply indicators. The impact of specialized 
immigration is also larger for women with more care responsibilities (i.e., with 
children under three or permanently disabled persons at home). Other groups of 
immigrants, not specialized in domestic services, do not exert a similar impact on 
hours worked by highly skilled Italian women; and, on the other hand, specialized 
immigrants do not affect hours worked by men who are much less engaged in 
domestic work. Finally, we find that immigration arises as a substitute for welfare 
services provided at the local level because its impact is stronger in those 
municipalities where social and family policies are less developed. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the 
literature on immigration and female labor supply. The empirical approach, the   7
data, and the identification strategy are discussed in section 3, whereas in section 
4 we present our main findings and provide some robustness checks. In section 5, 
we focus on hours worked by highly skilled natives, and we provide further 
evidence on the household production channel and the interaction between 
specialized immigration and the welfare services publicly provided at the local 
level. Section 6 presents some concluding remarks. 
2.  LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This paper is at the crossing of two strands of the literature. The first is 
related to the impact of immigration on host countries. The second concerns the 
incentives and the constraints that affect the female labor supply. 
The effects of immigration are traditionally viewed in terms of 
complementarity or substitutability with natives in the production sector (Card, 
2001; Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2006).
2 In addition, the empirical 
evidence on Italian data is mostly focused on these issues. Venturini and Villosio 
(2006) and D’Amuri and Pinotti (2010) examine the impact of immigration on 
labor market opportunities for natives. Accetturo et al. (2009) assess the impact of 
low-skilled immigration on firms’ investment decisions.
3 However, another 
channel might be at work: immigrants may be substitute natives in the production 
of household services. This, in turn, may affect the native labor supply by 
removing a preexisting rationing and/or by reducing the market price of those 
services. Although female immigrants represent a significant fraction of the labor 
employed in household services, the effect of their inflows on the native labor 
supply through the household production channel is poorly investigated. 
Moreover, the studies on the impact of immigration on the native labor supply 
focus on the extensive margin (employment rate or labor force participation) and 
very seldom on the intensive margin (hours worked). 
The second strand of the literature on which we draw deals with incentives 
and constraints on the female labor supply. Connelly (1992), Powell (1998), 
Anderson and Levine (1999), Gelbach (2002), and Baker et al. (2008), among 
others, have highlighted the importance of the supply and prices of child care and 
other family services. In addition, in this case, the role of the female immigrants 
who largely provide (informal) household services from housekeeping to child 
and elder care has been nearly ignored. 
Recently, some papers have attempted to bridge the gap. Cortes and Tessada 
(2009) examine the impact of low-skilled immigration on the labor supply of 
highly skilled U.S. women. They find no effect on the extensive margin and 
significant effects on the intensive margin. Farrè et al. (2009) use a similar 
approach for Spain. They find no effect on the probability of being employed and 
a significant effect on hours worked. The latter is found for both low and highly 
skilled natives. Furtado and Hock (2008) use a slightly different perspective and 
examine how immigration affects the work-fertility trade-off in the U.S. They find 
that immigrant-led declines in child-care costs increase the joint likelihood of 
                                                 
2 See Okkerse (2008) and the works cited therein for a review of the literature. 
3 Brandolini et al. (2005) find that there is a statistically significant wage differential between 
natives and immigrants mostly because immigrants usually work in less-productive firms.   8
childbearing and employment, indicating a substantial reduction in role 
incompatibility between the two. 
Italy certainly represents an interesting case study in this respect. As shown 
in Figure 1, the female activity rate is 51.6, more than 12 percentage points below 
the EU average. In terms of time use, Italian women devote considerably more 
time to domestic activities with respect to their European counterparts. In 
addition, among employed women, as reported in Figure 2, an Italian woman 
spends nearly four hours per day in domestic work, a figure much higher than the 
European average.
4 In terms of hours worked, the evidence is mixed, even though 
the fraction of women working 40 hours per week or more (41 percent) is below 
the U.S. and the OECD average.
5 The usual explanations for these figures are 
cultural motives that have shaped a model of a family where women are primarily 
responsible for unpaid work at home and men are the breadwinners and the 
inadequate welfare policies that have affected gender relations and constrained 
women’s labor supply (Chiuri, 2000; Bettio and Plantenga, 2004; Del Boca and 
Vuri, 2007). In the welfare state literature, Italy is the archetype of the 
Mediterranean or Southern model (Ferrera, 1996), where the family plays a 
fundamental role, and, at the same time, family policies are extraordinarily 
underdeveloped. However, recent inflows of immigrants have represented a 
partial remedy to the inadequacy of welfare policies. As it is quite evident from 
Figure 3, a significant fraction of foreign-born employment is in private 
households (11.4).
6 Comparable figures are recorded in Spain, whereas the foreign 
workers employed in households are considerably lower in Germany, France, and 
the U.S., and they are almost negligible in the Scandinavian countries. 
Therefore, it is likely that the increase of low-skilled immigration has lead 
to a substitution of native women as producers and distributors of welfare within 
the family. This, in turn, might have increased the native women’s labor supply. 
We expect that this effect is stronger for those women who have a higher 
opportunity cost of their time.
7 A concern with this interpretation is that low-
skilled immigration might also affect the labor supply of native women through 
other channels, such as interactions in the production sector. To identify the 
household production channel, we focus on specialized immigrants and provide 
some further pieces of evidence supporting our interpretation. We also examine 
the interaction between care services provided by immigrants and those publicly 
provided by local municipalities.
8 
                                                 
4 Domestic activities include, among others, cleaning a dwelling, food preparation, dishwashing, 
laundry and ironing, child care, and help to the elderly. 
5 See OECD, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/33/43199420.xls. 
6 See Bettio et al. (2006) for a discussion on the “care drain” phenomenon and the specificities of 
Italy. 
7 Mazzolari and Ragusa (2007) document that skilled workers demand more of market substitutes 
for home production activities. 
8 It is worth noting that substitution in domestic activities might also imply more leisure instead of 
more time spent at work. Unfortunately, we observe only hours worked. However, it is reasonable 
to expect that substitution in household production affects both hours worked and leisure time and 
that our findings underestimate the overall effect.   9
3.  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA 
We exploit the geographical heterogeneity of the immigrant distribution as a 
main source of variability (so-called “area-approach”). We estimate a reduced 
form equation of the female labor supply explained by individual characteristics 
(age, education, number of children, marital status, etc.), local context variables 
(female unemployment rate, GDP per worker, population density), and by the 
incidence of female immigrants specialized in household production: 
 
t i l i t l t i EFFECTS FIXED Z X IMMIGR const LS , 1 , ,             
 
where  LS is the outcome variable, and i and t denote individuals and years, 
respectively. We consider two outcomes variables: labor force participation and 
weekly hours worked, conditional on working a positive number of hours. 
IMMIGR is the one-year lagged incidence of specialized immigrants in the LLM l 
where woman i resides. X is a matrix of individual-level controls; Z includes 
controls at the LLM level. We also add season and year dummies to take out the 
effects of seasonality and other economic-wide conditions that could shape the 
labor supply, regional fixed effects to capture unobserved variables at that 
territorial level, and dummies obtained interacting regions and year to capture the 
regional business cycles. 
3.1.  Data and Variables 
Information on the female labor supply is drawn from the LFS. The main 
objective of the survey is to supply accurate and official statistics regarding the 
employed and unemployed population in Italy; however, incomes are not 
available. The survey is conducted on a quarterly basis, and the representative 
sample is approximately 76.800 families per period. We pool data from the 
quarterly 2006, 2007, and 2008 waves. Our sample is restricted to the females in 
the age bracket 15–64 (working age population). 
Table 1 shows the main descriptive statistics of our sample. As far as our 
outcome variables are concerned, one-half of the sample participates in the labor 
market with a huge heterogeneity across educational levels: the participation rate 
varies from about 36 percent for those with at most compulsory education to 83 
percent for those with a university degree. When looking at the intensive margin, 
employed Italian women work on average nearly 33 hours per week. The number 
of hours is higher for those with at most compulsory education and for those with 
a post-graduate degree. Women with children under the age of three work two and 
one-fourth hours less than other women. 
Individual data on the female labor supply are matched with aggregate data 
on the presence of immigrants at the local level. Our chosen territorial unit of 
analysis is the LLM, which is a cluster of municipalities representing a self-
contained labor market, built by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) 
based on the degree of workday commuting by the residents. We think that the 
data represent the best territorial configuration in terms of labor market features 
and probably the most appropriate units to analyze externalities from immigration.   10
We also prefer to use LLMs instead of a larger partition of the territory because 
the supply of domestic services is intrinsically local and cannot be traded outside 
a small cluster of cities. It is worth noting that in our data one immigrant out of 
four works in a municipality that is different from that in which he resides, 
whereas almost everyone works in the same LLM in which he lives. 
Immigration in Italy has increased significantly in recent years. At the end 
of 2008, there were about 3.9 million resident foreigners, 6.5 percent of the 
resident population against less than 1 percent in 1991. Immigration is mostly low 
skilled. According to the OECD (2009), in Italy, about 10 percent of the non-
OECD immigrants have a tertiary degree against 23 percent in Spain and about 30 
in France, Sweden, the UK, and the U.S. The female component has gained 
increasing relevance and now exceeds that of men, against about 40 percent at the 
beginning of the 1990s. The growth of female immigration has to be attributed to 
a considerable extent to reunification motives. In 2008, more than half of female 
residence permits were for family reasons. 
Because we are interested in investigating the household production 
channel, our key explanatory variable is not immigration tout court but female 
immigration specialized in household services. Specialization is defined on a 
home-country basis. Using microdata from the LFS, we computed for each 
country the share employed in domestic services, which includes unqualified 
personnel assigned to cleaning services, toilets, laundry, sanitary, and other 
services to families. We define as specialized countries the first 10 countries in 
terms of these shares provided that the number of observations in the citizenship 
cell is greater than 200. In alphabetical order, the countries are: Ecuador, 
Moldavia, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sri Lanka, and 
Ukraine. Female immigrants from these 10 countries are characterized by high 
employment rates and the fact that they work disproportionately in household 
services (see Figure 4 for a comparison with other female immigrants).
9 Three out 
of five work in this sector (almost 90 percent for the Philippines and Sri Lanka, 
around 70 percent for Ecuador, Peru, and Ukraine); in contrast, among the other 
largest communities, the percentage diminishes to around one-third for female 
immigrants from Albania and to 3 percent for those from China. Whereas 
specialized immigrants represent less than 4 percent of the overall female 
employment, they account for nearly one-fourth of the employment in domestic 
services. Specialized immigrants have increased significantly in recent years: they 
represented about 23 percent of overall female immigrants in the mid 1990s 
versus more than 53 percent at the end of 2008. 
We also consider a large number of other explanatory variables to control 
for additional individual and local determinants of labor supply. Descriptive 
statistics are reported in Table 1. 
3.2. Instrumental  Variable 
There are some threats to the validity of our empirical strategy. First, 
                                                 
9 See Bettio et al. (2006) for an analysis on immigrant care workers. See Accetturo and Infante 
(2009) for an analysis on variability across ethnic groups in terms of female immigrants’ labor 
supply.   11
immigrants are not randomly distributed across labor markets, and this makes it 
difficult to isolate the effect of immigration on natives from other associated 
phenomena. Namely, there might be some local omitted variable (e.g., local 
amenities and/or the local degree of economic development) that might attract 
immigrants and, at the same time, affect the natives’ labor supply decisions. 
Second, reverse causality might be at work: native females who work more 
intensively could attract a higher number of specialized immigrants. Third, there 
might be some concerns about the measure of our key variable due to 
undocumented immigrants.
10 To address these issues, we adopt an instrumental 
variable strategy.
11 
Our instrument is a modified version of the standard “shift-share 
methodology” (Card, 2001) that exploits the fact that immigrants tend to settle in 
places where immigrants from the same country already reside. In this approach, 
the predicted end-of-period composition of a region’s immigrant population can 
be computed based on its beginning-of-period composition by country of origin 
and subsequent inflows. One potential criticism is that if local economic shocks 
that attracted immigrants at the beginning-of-period are persistent over time the 
instrument cannot credibly solve the endogeneity problem. We believe that our 
approach represents an improvement in this direction. In fact, we distinguish 
immigrants by gender, recognizing that pull (labor market) factors that attract 
male immigrants are significantly different from those that attract female 
immigrants. Figure 5 provides a graphical intuition for this: 55 percent of male 
immigrants are employed in the industrial and construction sectors against less 
than 10 percent of females. At the same time, about 65 percent of females work in 
public, social, and family services against 12 percent of males.
12 
The instrument is built as follows. First, we compute the fraction of male 
immigrants living in LLM l in 1995 by country-of-birth c; the countries are those 
whose females we define as specialized in household production. Then, we apply 
the ratios obtained in the first step as weights to distribute across the LLMs the 
new waves of female immigrants from the same countries. Finally, we collapse 
the number of immigrants by country to obtain the total predicted immigrants by 
LLM-year. Formally: 
 




                                                 
10 Notice that our fixed effects control for the incidence of undocumented immigrants that varies 
by region, year, and interaction region per year. 
11 There can be a fourth possible source of bias. The implicit assumption of our empirical 
specification is that LLMs are closed, thus ignoring the in- and out-migration of natives in 
response to immigrant inflows (Borjas’ critique). The IV strategy does not address this source of 
bias; therefore, in the empirical section, we check the robustness of our results taking into account 
this further issue. 
12 It is worth noting that the distribution by gender of immigrants from specialized countries is not 
homogenous across LLMs: in 1995, the percentage of females was 43, and it varied from a 
maximum of 72 to a minimum of 25; the interquartile range with respect to the median was 27 
percent.   12
where δcl measures the fraction of male immigrants from country c that are settled 
in LLM l in 1995, and IMMct represents the total number of female immigrants 
from the same country at time t in Italy.
13 
Concerning the relevance of our instrumental variable, in Table 2, we report 
the first-stage regression. According to these estimates, the predicted share of 
specialized immigrants is strongly correlated with the actual share. Moreover, an 
increase of 1 percent in the instrumental variable increases the share of specialized 
immigrants by 0.28 percent. The associated t and F statistics are, respectively, 
above 8 and 70, which allow us to clearly reject the null of weak instrument (see 
Stock and Yogo, 2005). 
In summary, the exogeneity of our instrument relies on the fact that previous 
settlements are unrelated to current local economic conditions and that pull factors 
differ significantly between males and females. On the other hand, the correlation 
between the instrument and the (potentially) endogenous variable is guaranteed by 
the fact that the network effect and reunification motives play an important role 
for immigrants’ location choices.
14 First-stage estimates support the relevance of 
our instrument. 
4.  RESULTS 
In the following subsection, we report ML/OLS and IV estimates for both 
labor force participation and hours worked. We consider the overall sample of 
native women in the working age and two subsamples defined based on the 
educational level to account for (potential) differential effects. Namely, we define 
as low educated those with at most compulsory schooling and as highly educated 
those with a university degree. In subsection 4.2, we provide some robustness 
checks. 
4.1. Baseline  Results 
Consider first the natives’ labor force participation (see Table 3).
15 We 
present two empirical specifications. The more parsimonious one excludes 
variables referring to household structure that, in principle, might be influenced 
by immigration to identify its overall effect. For example, Furtado and Hock 
(2008) find that low-skilled immigration increases the joint likelihood of 
childbearing and employment. According to our estimates, in all the 
specifications, schooling is positively related to labor force participation. Looking 
at the household variables, the number of children is one of the most important 
                                                 
13 The distribution of immigrants by gender, countries, and LLMs in 1995 is obtained by 
combining two different data sources provided by Istat. Data for Moldavia are available starting 
from 1998. 
14 Bartel (1989) is the first to show that settlement patterns of previous immigrants are a main 
determinant of immigrants’ location choices. Previous migrants might ease the arrival of 
newcomers by helping them in finding jobs and by providing an existing social network. In 
addition to network effects, our instrument exploits reunification motives: about one-half of 
female immigrants obtain a residence permit thanks to family reasons. 
15 In all regressions henceforth reported, standard errors are clustered at the LLM-level to meet the 
Moulton (1990) critique.   13
determinants of labor supply decisions. The impact is stronger for small children 
and lower for children of school age. On average, having a child under the age of 
three reduces by 40 percent the probability of being active in the labor force. If the 
child is of school age (six or older), the effect is much more limited: the 
probability of being active is reduced by 10 percent. The presence of elderly 
people (over 65) in the family has a negative effect on labor force participation. 
The effect of this variable is unclear on a priori ground. On one hand, some 
elderly people might need special care, thus inducing women to stay at home. On 
the other hand, they can take care of small children and thus, to the contrary, make 
it easier for young mothers to work more. The interpretation of the effect of 
persons permanently unable to work is unambiguous, and it corresponds to a 
reduction by 60 percent on the likelihood of being active. These findings are fairly 
similar across education groups and largely confirm the role of family 
responsibilities in affecting female labor supply decisions.
16 Turning to our key 
variable, probit estimates show that immigration does not affect the labor force 
participation of Italian woman. Splitting our sample according to the educational 
level, it turns out that immigrant inflow has a weakly positive effect on graduates’ 
choices, although it remains not significantly different from zero in the case of a 
woman with at most compulsory education. When we enrich the model with 
household variables (last three columns), the coefficient of specialized immigrants 
is no more significant for highly educated natives. However, as stated before, 
there are many potential sources of bias, and we have to rely on an instrumental 
variable strategy. IV estimates are reported in Table 3, Panel B. According to 
these estimates, the impact of specialized immigrants on female labor force 
participation is not significantly different from zero in all specifications and for 
both the subsamples. 
We now turn our attention to the intensive margin of the labor supply, the 
OLS estimates reported in Table 4, Panel A. The coefficients of our control 
variables have the same sign of those estimated in the labor-force-participation 
equation, except for elderly people. Again, the impact of children is sizeable and 
is stronger for children of the preschool age. Having a child under the age of three 
reduces by about two and one-half hours the number of weekly hours worked; the 
impact is 45 minutes for children aged six or more. The presence of specialized 
immigrants is now significantly and positively associated with hours worked by 
native females. The effect is driven by the highly educated subgroup. In Panel B, 
we report IV estimates that lead to an upward revision of the OLS ones because 
the effect on the intensity of work turns out to be stronger and more statistically 
significant. This would suggest the existence of unobservables that are positively 
correlated with immigration and negatively correlated with hours worked. 
According to these estimates, a 1 percent increase in the incidence of specialized 
immigrants leads to an increase in the hours worked of about 20 minutes per 
week; again, the effect is driven by highly educated natives for whom the 
estimated impact is around half an hour (corresponding to 1.6 percent of the 
weekly hours worked). For low-educated natives, the impact is not significantly 
                                                 
16 As mentioned above, we also include further variables at the individual and local level. For the 
sake of simplicity (and because they are relatively less important for our purposes), we do not 
comment on these additional estimates.   14
different from zero. Note also that the magnitude of the estimated parameters with 
and without household characteristics, which are potentially shaped by 
immigration, are not very different, signaling that the effect of immigration on 
hours worked is mainly a direct effect and that indirect effects through other 
channels (e.g., fertility decisions) are negligible in our data. Therefore, in what 
follows, we focus on the richer model that is our preferred specification. 
Overall, our results highlight the fact that female immigrants change the 
time use of highly skilled natives without affecting their labor force 
participation.
17 Our interpretation is that immigrants replace household work and 
highly educated natives can supply a higher number of hours, specializing in the 
production of goods and services that better suit their competencies. The 
substitution effect in household production is arguably more important at the 
margin because employed women can decide to “buy” housekeeping activities for 
a limited number of hours per week or rely on informal and flexible child care 
arrangements (without being forced to work fewer hours). This result is also 
consistent with the existence of fixed costs that hamper female labor force 
participation and that are not removed by low-skilled immigration. 
4.2. Robustness 
A well-known drawback of the area approach is that native workers are 
mobile across local labor markets. Therefore, they might offset the supply shocks 
created by low-skilled immigration, thus undermining the identification of the true 
relationship between immigration and labor market outcomes. For example, 
adapting the argument by Borjas (2003), if the arrival of one low-skilled 
immigrant leads one low-skilled native to move to other LLMs, then low-skilled 
immigration would have no detectable impact on the supply of household services 
at the LLM level.
18 This mechanism would lead to an underestimation of the 
impact of low-skilled immigration. To control for this type of labor market 
adjustment, we exclude from our sample the observations in the LLMs belonging 
to the lower or the upper decile of the distribution of the low-educated native 
female net rate (normalized with respect to the overall female population). The 
results are substantially unaffected (see Table 5). Another potential source of bias 
is the selective self-assignment of individuals to LLMs in response to 
immigration. Therefore, we restrict our regressions to the subsample of “stayers” 
(those who have not changed their place of residence in the last years). Again, our 
results are unaffected. All in all, we recognize that these tests might not be fully 
conclusive; however, the available evidence suggests that native internal mobility 
in response to immigration is not an issue in our data. 
As a further robustness check, we consider the subsample of married women 
to add comparability with the literature on the determinants of the female labor 
                                                 
17 D’Amuri and Pinotti (2010) find a positive and significant effect of immigration on female 
natives’ employment. However, we argue that our findings on the extensive margin are not in 
contrast with theirs because we focus on specialized immigration, whereas they consider overall 
immigration. When we modify our target regressor to include all nationalities, the effect on labor 
force participation turns out to be significantly greater than zero. 
18 Mocetti and Porello (2010) show that immigration in Italy has a displacement effect on low-
educated natives (both for male and females).   15
supply.
19 Being married might affect the labor supply for several reasons. A 
husband’s socioeconomic status affects the family income and, through this, the 
wife’s labor supply. Moreover, having husbands who contribute to domestic 
activities makes it easier for women to reconcile work and family. Therefore, in 
Table 6, we consider only married women and introduce controls for the 
husband’s schooling, employment status, professional qualification, and hours 
worked (if any). Our baseline results are substantially unaffected. 
In the first three columns of Table 7, we consider as a dependent variable 
the discrete choice between part-time and full-time work in order to account for 
the non-normality of the distribution of hours worked.
20 The dependent variable 
takes the value of one if the woman is employed full time and zero otherwise. The 
incidence of specialized immigrants significantly and positively affects the 
probability of women to work full time. The impact is stronger for women with a 
university degree, but it is now extended also to those with a lower educational 
level. In the last three columns, we restrict the analysis to the subsample of full-
time workers. Again, we find a positive relationship between specialized 
immigration and intensity of work, driven by the highly educated component. 
Finally, we control the robustness of our results on the intensive margin 
using a different definition for skilled women. So far, we have adopted a partition 
of the population in skill groups according to the educational level. In Table 8, we 
consider a different partition relying on professional qualifications and the type of 
job. We find that the impact of specialized immigrants is higher and statistically 
significant for highly skilled professions (lawyers, executives, highly specialized 
professions, etc.). A 1 percent increase of the incidence of specialized 
immigration leads to an increase of 40 minutes per week of time devoted to work. 
The impact is positive and significant also for medium-high skilled women 
(technical profession employees), whereas it is null for the remaining working 
population. Therefore, our results are robust to different definitions of skill 
groups. However, it is worth noting that native occupation and the skill content of 
the job might itself be endogenous (Peri and Sparber, 2009). Therefore, a 
definition of the skill group in terms of educational level is arguably more 
appropriate.
21 
                                                 
19 Connelly (1992), Ribar (1992), and Powell (1998), among the others, examine labor supply for 
married women only. 
20 Hours worked has a bimodal distribution with two peaks at around 20 and 40 hours. 
21 Our findings on the intensive margin might suffer from a selectivity bias arising from the fact 
that hours worked are observed only for employed women. To tackle this issue, we run two further 
empirical exercises. First, we consider a standard Heckman selection model. As there are unlikely 
to be any variables affecting the labor supply on the extensive margin that do not affect it on the 
intensive margin, the second-stage equation is identified by the nonlinearity of the functional form. 
In a further check, we use the labor-force-participation status in the previous year as an exclusion 
restriction. Though we recognize that these choices might be not fully satisfying, we did not find 
in the empirical literature an alternative and more convincing exclusion restriction. Second, we 
treat unemployed woman as zero-hour workers and estimate an IV tobit model. Both exercises 
confirm our baseline effects: specialized immigrants increase the hours worked by native females, 
and the effect is driven by the highly skill segment of the population. Estimates are available upon 
request.   16
5.  REFINEMENTS 
So far, we found that specialized immigration has a positive and significant 
impact on the number of hours worked by highly skilled Italian women. We 
interpreted this evidence as the effect of substitution in domestic activities. 
Notwithstanding, there might be competing stories explaining the same patterns of 
results without relying on the household production channel. The next subsection 
is dedicated to finding other pieces of evidence in support of our interpretation. 
Moreover, if the effect passes through the provision of care services, one might be 
interested in analyzing the interaction between specialized immigrants and the 
amount of welfare services publicly provided at the local level. This last point is 
addressed in subsection 5.2. 
5.1.  Is the Household Transmission Channel at Work? 
Low-skilled immigrants might substitute native females in the domestic 
activities allowing them to spend more time at work. However, the impact of 
immigration on hours worked might also pass through other channels. The most 
obvious is via wages. Low-skilled immigrants might be complementary to highly 
skilled Italian women, thus increasing their productivity and their wages (and their 
incentive to spend more time at work). If so, the positive link between 
immigration and hours worked is not related to the household production 
transmission channel, but it is the result of the interaction in the production sector. 
As a second kind of mechanism, note that the increase in the number of immigrant 
workers in a firm might expand the need for coordination and management 
activities, thus increasing the number of hours worked by (native) managers and 
executives. If these alternative stories are correct, it is not clear what really drives 
the positive observed effect. 
We believe that the way in which we construct our explanatory variable 
(specialized immigrants) reduces the scope for other interpretations. Still, there is 
room for them. In the following, we provide some further evidence suggesting 
that household production is the channel at work. First, we examine whether and 
how the inflows of these immigrants have affected prices and quantities of 
domestic services. Second, we verify whether our results are reinforced when we 
consider the subsample of women with more care responsibilities and confirmed 
when we change the explanatory variable (using female immigrants less 
specialized in domestic services and more specialized in the production sector) or 
the dependent variable (hours worked by native men who are clearly less engaged 
in domestic activities than native women). 
The first test for the existence of the household production channel consists 
in verifying whether the inflow of specialized immigrants has produced some 
effects in terms of availability and the prices of domestic services. In Table 9, we 
provide some empirical evidence on it. Data on prices are collected by Istat, and 
they are available for only 35 provincial capitals out of 103 for years 2002–2008. 
An IV regression of domestic service price growth on specialized immigrants’ 
growth shows that the latter variable has a negative but statistically weak effect on   17
price dynamics (first column).
22 As far as the quantity side is concerned, we find a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between the overall employment 
in domestic services, and our key left-hand-side variable (second column). Even 
though a complete analysis of these effects is beyond the scope of the paper, these 
simple evidences show that specialized immigration has affected domestic service 
supply by increasing quantity and slightly reducing prices. 
In Table 10, we report our baseline estimate in the first column that is 
contrasted with those obtained when (i) considering the subsample of women with 
more care responsibilities,(ii) changing the definition of the dependent variable, 
and (iii) changing the definition of the independent variable. Let us discuss them 
in turn. If household production is the channel at work, the impact of a specialized 
immigrant would be stronger for women who have more care responsibilities.
23 
According to Del Boca and Vuri (2007), in Italy, coverage rates for children under 
the age of three is very low (6 percent) from an international perspective; 
therefore, women with children under the age of three are expected to be more 
sensitive to alternative and informal supplies of child services (nannies). A similar 
reasoning can be applied in the case of cohabiting individuals who are 
permanently unable to work. In fact, we find that the estimated coefficient is 
higher for women with children under the age of three and/or with permanently 
disabled persons at home (second column). In the third column, we replace the 
first 10 countries specialized in domestic activities with the first 10 among the 
remaining countries in terms of size.
24 The instrument is modified accordingly. 
Female foreign workers in this second group of countries are much less involved 
in domestic activities (the proportion is one-half that of specialized immigrants) 
and are more represented in the industry and in commercial activities. Therefore, 
if the impact of low-skilled immigration passes through the interactions in the 
production sector, we would expect a stronger relationship with hours worked by 
highly skilled women; contrarily, if the impact passes through the household 
production channel, we would expect, if any, a weaker relationship. According to 
our estimates, the coefficient is not statistically different from zero thus 
reinforcing our interpretation on the importance of the household production 
channel. Finally, in the fourth column, we consider men’s hours worked in place 
of women’s. The argument is similar as above. If the impact of specialized 
immigration passes through the interactions in the production sector, we would 
expect a positive relationship with men’s hours worked; in contrast, if the impact 
passes through the household production channel, we would expect, if any, a 
weaker relationship because Italian males are much less involved in domestic 
activities than females.
25 We find a positive but not statistically significant 
                                                 
22 We consider price growth because a price index is the only available variable. 
23 We rank family responsibilities in terms of children, the age of children, and the presence at 
home of persons permanently unable to work. As far as elderly people are concerned, not knowing 
their health makes it difficult to contemplate whether this represents a burden or an asset for the 
family. 
24 They are, in alphabetical order, Albania, Brazil, China, Egypt, Ghana, India, Macedonia, 
Nigeria, Serbia, and Tunisia. 
25 In Italy, there is a very unequal distribution of domestic activities between males and females. 
According to the Harmonised European Time Use Survey, the time spent in household activities 
by Italian employed women is 3.3 times higher than that by employed men, whereas the   18
relationship. In summary, the evidence reported in Table 10 supports the idea that 
the impact is a result of the outsourcing of household production.
26 
5.2.  Does Female Immigration Substitute for Welfare Policies? 
Our last question concerns whether and how specialized immigration 
interacts with publicly provided welfare services. To address this issue, we collect 
data on the welfare services at the municipal level. 
We consider municipalities because entitlements for the welfare services are 
residence based. Moreover, in Italy, a significant amount of those services are 
provided at that level. The number of spaces in the child-care structures (asili 
nido) and their costs are set by local governments, and they vary significantly 
from one municipality to another (Del Boca and Vuri, 2007; Zollino, 2008). 
Similarly, municipalities differ substantially in their assistance to elderly people. 
From the 2001 Census, we draw information on the number of employees in 
child-care institutions, preschools, elder care, and other forms of social assistance. 
This figure has been normalized with respect to the population under six and over 
65. Moreover, from the balance sheets of Italian municipalities, we collect data on 
local public spending for welfare services.
27 Namely, we refer to child care, elder 
care, and other social care spending. Again, we normalize these figures to obtain 
per capita measures. 
We add these further controls and their interaction with the incidence of 
specialized immigration, and, consistently, we focus on hours worked by women 
with children under the age of six, elderly people, or persons permanently unable 
to work at home. In all the specifications, we find that specialized immigrants 
continue to have a sizeable and statistically significant impact on the intensity of 
work of highly educated natives (Table 11). Moreover, as expected, the number 
employed in social care and the amount of welfare spending have a positive and 
significant impact. However, the most interesting result is the negative and 
significant relationship between specialized immigration and publicly provided 
welfare service indicators. That is, the (positive) impact of specialized 
immigration is stronger in those municipalities where welfare policies are less 
developed. According to these estimates, the impact of specialized immigration on 
the weekly hours worked by highly educated women is 40 minutes for those 
living in municipalities at the 25th percentile in terms of employees in welfare 
services, and diminishes to 20 minutes for those living in municipalities at the 
75th percentile. Similarly, the impact of specialized immigration diminishes from 
60 to 35 minutes when passing from municipalities at the 25th percentile to those 
                                                                                                                                      
corresponding figure is 2.6 for Spain and less than 2 for the other main European countries (Istat, 
2008). 
26 A further potential explanation of our results passes through gender reallocation of labor in 
response to immigration: if foreign workers displace native males, native females might be 
induced to increase their labor supply. However, D’Amuri and Pinotti (2010) and Mocetti and 
Porello (2010) do not find evidence of a displacement effect on Italian males; if any, immigrants 
turn out to be complements of highly skilled natives. 
27 These data include detailed measures of revenues and expenditures as gathered by the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs. They are electronically available for the period 2001–2005. We consider the 
average of the period in order to smooth imputation errors and other sources of noise.   19
at the 75th percentile in terms of social public spending per capita. 
These findings confirm once again that household production is the channel 
at work, and they also show that specialized immigrants arise as substitutes for 
welfare policies. 
6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we examined the impact of immigration on the female labor 
supply. To identify a causal link, we adopt an instrumental variable strategy. Our 
instrument is intended to isolate the “exogenous” component of immigrant 
distribution across LLMs using the existence of previous enclaves of males as a 
determinant of the current distribution of females. The validity of the instrument 
relies on the fact that previous settlements are reasonably unrelated to current 
economic conditions and that pull factors for males differ significantly from those 
of females. 
We find that a higher incidence of immigrants who supply household 
services enables native women to spend more time at work without affecting their 
labor force participation. The impact is concentrated on highly skilled women 
who have a higher opportunity cost of their time. These results hold also after a 
battery of robustness checks, including those related to Borjas’ critique. Some 
further pieces of evidence confirm that the impact passes through substitution in 
household work rather than complementarities in the production sector. First, the 
inflows of specialized immigrants have affected prices and quantities of domestic 
services. Second, we find that the impact of specialized immigration is larger for 
those women who have more care responsibilities. Third, the impact on hours 
worked is not found when we change the explanatory variable (using female 
immigrants who are less specialized in domestic services and more specialized in 
the production sector) or the dependent variable (using hours worked by native 
men who are clearly less engaged in domestic activities than native women). 
Finally, we find that immigration arises as a substitute for child care and social 
spending at the municipal level. 
From a policy maker’s point of view, it is debatable whether this model of 
welfare is a proper one. The choice to use the services of migrant women has 
ensured the continuity of a model of assistance originally based on the family 
(familism). Wives have been substituted, to some extent, by nannies and 
housekeepers in household production activities. However, this private welfare 
model raises complex issues in terms of equity and sustainability. Equity relates to 
the fact that these services, though cheaper, might still continue to be unaffordable 
for less advantaged families. Sustainability, in turn, depends on the maintenance 
of this large supply of low-skilled immigrants. Indeed, better economic prospects 
in the countries of origin or in different destination countries might narrow the 
immigrant inflows.   20
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Minutes per day devoted to domestic work by employed females. The domestic work indeed includes all the 
activities relative to meal preparation, house cleaning, household members’ care, plant and animal care, goods 
and household maintenance, shopping, and various other tasks. The figure for Europe is obtained as a simple 
average of the 15 countries contained in the database of the Harmonised European Time Use Survey. Source: 
Istat (2008). 
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Figures refer to 2007 (for EU25 refer to 2005–2006 average). Source: OECD (2009). 
 
 

















Sectoral distribution by country of female foreign workers. Specialized immigrants come from Ecuador, 
Moldavia, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine; other female 
immigrants come from the remaining countries. Commerce includes commerce, hotel, restaurants, transport 
and communications; business services include financial intermediation and business and professional 
services; public and social services include public administration, health, education, and other social services. 
The figures are averages for years 2006–2008. Source: LFS. 
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Sectoral distribution by gender of foreign workers from Ecuador, Moldavia, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine. Commerce include commerce, hotel, restaurants, transport and 
communications; business services include financial intermediation and business and professional services; 
public and social services include public administration, health, education, and other social services. The 
figures are averages for years 2006–2008. Source: LFS. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean  St.  dev.  Min.  Max. 
Labor force participation   0.507   0.500  0.000  1.000 
Weekly hours worked  32.895  11.539  1.000  129.000 
Specialized immigrants  2.132  1.353  0.000  7.310 
Age 47.338  10.428  15.000  65.000 
Schooling 9.920  4.179  0.000  21.000 
Married 0.791  0.407  0.000  1.000 
# children under 3  0.097  0.317  0.000  4.000 
# children aged 3–5  0.108  0.332  0.000  4.000 
# children aged 6 or more  0.977  0.964  0.000  11.000 
# elderly people (aged 65 or more)  0.146  0.384  0.000  6.000 
# (persons permanently) unable to work  0.017  0.134  0.000  5.000 
Temporary contract  0.098  0.298  0.000  1.000 
Log Tenure  4.527  1.286  0.000  6.475 
Stayer 0.975  0.157  0.000  1.000 
Female unemployment rate  16.785  12.412  1.955  51.025 
Density 0.485  0.736  0.012  3.989 
Log GDP per worker  10.792  0.174  10.085  11.195 
Further controls at the individual level include dummies for sector of activity (2 digits), professional qualification (2 
digits) and commuting behavior. All the variables at the individual level are drawn from LFS; all variables at the 
local level are taken from Istat. 
 
Table 2: First-stage Regression 
  (1) (2) 
Instrument 0.347***  0.350*** 
 (0.040)  (0.042) 
FE YES  YES 
Local controls    YES 
First stage F-statistics  73.6  70.7 
Observations 1,424  1,424 
The dependent variable is the incidence of specialized immigrants over the total female population at the LLM level. 
The instrumental variable is the incidence of specialized immigrants built using previous settlements of males from the 
same countries. Fixed effects (FE) include year and regional dummies. Local controls include the female 
unemployment rate, GDP per worker, and population density at the LLM level. The dataset is obtained by pooling data 
at the LLM level for the period 2006–2008. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the LLM level. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3: Specialized Immigrants and Labor Force Participation 
Panel A – Probit estimates 













Specialized immigrants  -0.007  -0.008  0.027*    -0.007  -0.008  0.023 
 (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.014)    (0.009)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Age 0.230***  0.201***  0.378***    0.247***  0.212***  0.381*** 
 (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.010)    (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.011) 
Age squared  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.004***    -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.005*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Years of schooling  0.109***  0.083***  0.025***    0.108***  0.081***  0.028*** 
 (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.009)    (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.009) 
Married         -0.383***  -0.429***  -0.194*** 
         (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.029) 
# children under 3          -0.290***  -0.274***  -0.346*** 
         (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.029) 
# children aged 3–5          -0.208***  -0.230***  -0.219*** 
         (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.024) 
# children aged 6 or more          -0.074***  -0.071***  -0.015 
         (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.016) 
# elderly people          -0.049***  -0.017  -0.200*** 
         (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.033) 
# unable to work          -0.462***  -0.424***  -0.441*** 
         (0.030)  (0.034)  (0.126) 
FE YES  YES  YES    YES  YES  YES 
Local controls  YES  YES  YES    YES  YES  YES 
Observations 469,435  252,106  51,616    469,435  252,106  51,616 
Panel B – IV probit estimates 













Specialized immigrants  0.015  0.021  0.031    0.011  0.019  0.024 
 (0.016)  (0.024)  (0.030)    (0.016)  (0.025)  (0.030) 
Age 0.230***  0.201***  0.378***    0.247***  0.212***  0.381*** 
 (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.010)    (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.011) 
Age squared  -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.004***    -0.003***  -0.003***  -0.005*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Years of schooling  0.109***  0.083***  0.025***    0.108***  0.081***  0.028*** 
 (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.009)    (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.009) 
Married         -0.383***  -0.429***  -0.194*** 
         (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.029) 
# children under 3          -0.290***  -0.274***  -0.346*** 
         (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.029) 
# children aged 3-5          -0.208***  -0.230***  -0.219*** 
         (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.024) 
# children aged 6 or more          -0.074***  -0.071***  -0.015 
         (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.016) 
# elderly people          -0.049***  -0.017  -0.200*** 
         (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.033) 
# unable to work          -0.462***  -0.424***  -0.441*** 
         (0.030)  (0.034)  (0.126) 
FE YES  YES  YES    YES  YES  YES 
Local controls  YES  YES  YES    YES  YES  YES 
Observations 469,435  252,106  51,616    469,435  252,106  51,616 
The dependent variable is labor force participation, which is a dummy equal to 1 if a native woman participates in 
the labor market and 0 otherwise. Panel A shows probit estimates, panel B shows IV probit estimates (specialized 
immigrants are instrumented with previous settlements of males from the same countries). Fixed effects (FE) 
include season, year, region, and region × year dummies. Local controls include female unemployment rate, GDP 
per worker, and population density at the LLM level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the LLM level. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
   27
Table 4: Specialized Immigrants and Hours Worked 
Panel A – OLS estimates 













Specialized immigrants  0.162**  0.131  0.249**    0.159**  0.137  0.197* 
 (0.078)  (0.110)  (0.121)    (0.076)  (0.112)  (0.112) 
Age -0.298***  0.018  -0.563***    -0.077**  0.095  -0.273*** 
 (0.040)  (0.060)  (0.100)    (0.036)  (0.063)  (0.098) 
Age squared  0.003***  -0.000  0.006***    0.000  -0.001*  0.002** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Years of schooling  0.068***  0.052  0.431***    0.072***  0.047  0.447*** 
 (0.015)  (0.051)  (0.094)    (0.014)  (0.051)  (0.089) 
Married         -1.879***  -1.811***  -1.536*** 
         (0.096)  (0.159)  (0.188) 
# children under 3          -2.619***  -2.357***  -3.212*** 
         (0.133)  (0.281)  (0.196) 
# children aged 3–5          -2.392***  -1.715***  -2.239*** 
         (0.121)  (0.221)  (0.194) 
# children aged 6 or more          -0.768***  -0.508***  -0.722*** 
         (0.064)  (0.084)  (0.095) 
# elderly people          0.254**  0.250  -0.041 
         (0.114)  (0.185)  (0.255) 
# unable to work          -0.590*  -0.906*  0.862 
         (0.334)  (0.479)  (0.922) 
Job characteristics  YES  YES  YES    YES  YES  YES 
FE YES  YES  YES    YES  YES  YES 
Local controls  YES  YES  YES    YES  YES  YES 
Observations 183,653  64,899  32,162    183,653  64,899  32,162 
Panel B – IV estimates 













Specialized immigrants  0.425***  0.353  0.589***    0.382***  0.341  0.495** 
 (0.152)  (0.215)  (0.209)    (0.141)  (0.212)  (0.193) 
Age -0.298***  0.018  -0.563***    -0.077**  0.094  -0.274*** 
 (0.040)  (0.059)  (0.100)    (0.036)  (0.063)  (0.097) 
Age squared  0.003***  -0.000  0.006***    0.000  -0.001*  0.002** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Years of schooling  0.066***  0.050  0.423***    0.071***  0.046  0.440*** 
 (0.015)  (0.051)  (0.094)    (0.014)  (0.051)  (0.089) 
Married         -1.883***  -1.816***  -1.532*** 
         (0.096)  (0.159)  (0.187) 
# children under 3          -2.616***  -2.354***  -3.207*** 
         (0.133)  (0.280)  (0.195) 
# children aged 3–5          -2.392***  -1.717***  -2.232*** 
         (0.120)  (0.221)  (0.193) 
# children aged 6 or more          -0.765***  -0.505***  -0.720*** 
         (0.064)  (0.084)  (0.095) 
# elderly people          0.260**  0.255  -0.020 
         (0.114)  (0.185)  (0.252) 
# unable to work          -0.578*  -0.888*  0.857 
         (0.333)  (0.479)  (0.915) 
Job characteristics  YES  YES  YES    YES  YES  YES 
FE YES  YES  YES    YES  YES  YES 
Local controls  YES  YES  YES    YES  YES  YES 
Observations 183,653  64,899  32,162    183,653  64,899  32,162 
The dependent variable is the number of weekly hours worked by native woman. Panel A shows OLS estimates, 
panel B shows IV estimates (specialized immigrants are instrumented with previous settlements of males from 
the same countries). Job characteristics include controls for temporary contracts, tenure, sector of activities, 
professional qualification and commuting behavior. Fixed effects (FE) include season, year, region and region × 
year dummies. Local controls include female unemployment rate, GDP per worker and population density at the 
LLM level. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the LLM level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5: Robustness for Native Internal Mobility 
  Labor force participation 
  Controlling for native internal mobility  Subsample of stayers 








Specialized  immigrants 0.004 -0.009 0.040 0.008 0.016  0.019 
  (0.020) (0.028) (0.036) (0.016) (0.025)  (0.032) 
Full set of controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations 374,672  198,389  42,077  457,526  249,136  48,061 
  Hours worked 
  Controlling for native internal mobility  Subsample of stayers 








Specialized immigrants  0.314  0.185  0.613**  0.403***  0.320  0.492*** 
  (0.195) (0.289) (0.257) (0.143) (0.227)  (0.178) 
Full set of controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  148,696 52,234  26,210 175,486 63,084  29,634 
The dependent variables are labor force participation (dummy equal to 1 if native woman participates to labor 
market and 0 otherwise) and weekly hours worked. Specialized immigrants are instrumented with previous 
settlements of males from the same countries. We run an IV probit in the first panel and a regression with 
instrumental variable in the second one. When controlling for native internal mobility, we exclude observation 
belonging to the LLMs whose low-educated native female net rate is below the lower decile or above the upper 
decile; the net rate is calculated at the provincial level for reasons of data availability; stayers are those who have 
not changed their place of residence in the last years. Full set of controls include all the explanatory variables 
considered in Table 3 for labor force participation and in Table 4 for hours worked. Standard errors are adjusted 
for clustering at the LLM level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 6: Only Married 













Specialized immigrants  0.001  0.012  0.009  0.376**  0.410  0.462** 
  (0.020) (0.030) (0.032) (0.164) (0.251)  (0.209) 
Full set of controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Controls for the husband  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations 371,167  202,818  38,403  137,628  48,893  23,583 
The dependent variables are labor force participation (dummy equal to 1 if native woman participates to labor 
market and 0 otherwise) and hours worked. Specialized immigrants are instrumented with previous settlements of 
males from the same countries. We run an IVPROBIT in columns 1 to 3 and a regression with instrumental variable 
in columns 4 to 6. Full set of controls include all the explanatory variables considered in Table 3 for labor force 
participation and in Table 4 for hours worked; all the specifications include also controls for education, employment 
status, professional qualification, and hours worked of the husband. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at 
the LLM level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   29
Table 7: Further Results on Time Use 
  Full time vs. part time  Hours worked by full-time workers 








Specialized immigrants  0.043**  0.048*  0.056**  0.193**  -0.014  0.351** 
  (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.094) (0.206)  (0.166) 
Full set of controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  183,653 64,899  32,162 134,583 44,520 26,631 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable (taking the value of 1 for full-time workers and 0 otherwise) in the 
first three columns, weekly hours worked in the last three columns. Specialized immigrants are instrumented 
with previous settlements of males from the same countries. We run an IV probit in columns 1 to 3 and a 
regression with instrumental variable in columns 4 to 6. Full set of controls include all the explanatory variables 
considered in Table 4. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the LLM level. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 









Specialized immigrants  0.678**  0.289**  0.130  0.251 
 (0.297)  (0.127)  (0.246)  (0.275) 
Full set of controls  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations 28,363  77,417  52,892  24,929 
The dependent variable is weekly hours worked. High-skilled professions include legislators, lawyers, 
executives, highly specialized professions, and entrepreneurs; middle-high skilled professions include technical 
professions and employees; middle-low skilled professions include artisans, workers in the commerce, 
specialized blue-collars; low skilled professions include low qualified jobs in industry and in the services. 
Specialized immigrants are instrumented with previous settlements of males from the same countries. Full set 
of controls include all the explanatory variables considered in Table 4. Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering at the LLM level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 9: Specialized Immigrants and Price and Quantities of Domestic Services 
  Effects on prices  Effects on quantities 
Specialized immigrants  -0.229 0.141*** 
 (0.249)  (0.050) 
Observations 246  721 
The dependent variable is annual price growth rate in domestic services in the first column and log of 
employees in domestic services in the second column. The explanatory variable is specialized immigrant 
annual growth rate in the first column and the log of specialized immigrants in the second column. Both 
variables are instrumented with previous settlements of males from the same countries. The dataset is 
obtained by pooling data for the period 2002–2008; information are collected at the provincial level; price 
indexes are available only for a subsample of provincial capitals. Both specifications include controls for 
population and GDP per capita, and year and regional fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
at the province level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 10: Further Evidence on the Household Production Channel 
 Hours  worked 
by highly educated 
women 
Hours worked 
by highly educated 
women with care 
responsibilities 
Hours worked 





Specialized immigrants  0.495**  0.908**    0.272 
 (0.193)  (0.435)    (0.195) 
Not specialized immigrants      0.322   
     (0.517)   
Full set of controls  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations 32,162  3,835  32,162  41,707 
The dependent variable is weekly hours worked. Women with care responsibilities are those with children under 
three and/or people permanently unable to work at home. Countries with specialized immigrants are Ecuador, 
Moldavia, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine; countries with not 
specialized immigrants are the first 10, among the remaining countries, in terms of numerosity: Albania, Brazil, 
China, Egypt, Ghana, India, Macedonia, Nigeria, Serbia, and Tunisia. Both specialized immigrants and not 
specialized immigrants are instrumented with previous settlements of males from the corresponding countries. Full 
set of controls include all explanatory variables reported in Table 4. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the 
LLM level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 11: Interaction between Specialized Immigrants and Local Welfare Services 
  Interaction with 
employees in social services 
Interaction with 
social public spending 
Specialized immigrants  0.922** 1.064** 
 (0.415)  (0.461) 
Employees in social services [ESS]  0.423**  
 (0.202)   
Specialized immigrants × ESS  -0.120*  
 (0.062)   
Social public spending [SPS]   5.977*** 
   (2.039) 
Specialized immigrants × SPS   -1.621*** 
   (0.613) 
Full set of controls  YES YES 
Observations  9,005 9,005 
The dependent variable is weekly hours worked. Specialized immigrants are instrumented with previous 
settlements of males from the same countries. The analysis is restricted to highly educated women. In addition to 
the full set of controls (all explanatory variables reported in Table 4), we add employees in social care (employees 
in child care, maternal school, elderly care, and other social services at the municipal level normalized with respect 
to the population under six and over 65), social public spending (municipal spending in child, elderly, and social 
care normalized with respect to the population under 6 and over 65) and their interaction with specialized 
immigrants. The selected sample is native women with children under six persons over 65, or persons unable to 
work. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the LLM level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
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